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Multilevel Threshold Secret and Function Sharing
based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem
Og˘uzhan Ersoy, Kamer Kaya and Kerem Kas¸kalog˘lu
Abstract—A recent work of Harn and Fuyou presents the first
multilevel (disjunctive) threshold secret sharing scheme based on
the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In this work, we first show that
the proposed method is not secure and also fails to work with a
certain natural setting of the threshold values on compartments.
We then propose a secure scheme that works for all threshold
settings. In this scheme, we employ a refined version of Asmuth-
Bloom secret sharing with a special and generic Asmuth-Bloom
sequence called the anchor sequence. Based on this idea, we also
propose the first multilevel conjunctive threshold secret sharing
scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Lastly, we
discuss how the proposed schemes can be used for multilevel
threshold function sharing by employing it in a threshold RSA
cryptosystem as an example.
Index Terms—Secret sharing, multilevel function sharing, mul-
tilevel threshold cryptography, Chinese Remainder Theorem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of secret sharing is being used in many crypto-
graphic protocols. As independently proposed by Shamir [1]
and Blakley [2], a secret-sharing scheme (SSS) involves a
dealer who has a secret s, a set of participants U that the
secret is shared amongst, and a collection A of the authorized
subsets of the U which is called the access structure. In a
SSS, the dealer distributes the shares to the participants such
that only the subsets in A can reconstruct the secret from the
corresponding shares. Furthermore, a SSS is called perfect if
all the subsets not in A will have the same probability of
guessing the secret as if they had no shares. We refer the reader
to a comprehensive survey [3] for practical applications of
secret sharing such as building authentication protocols which
stay secure even under the leakage of a number of servers’
data.
In threshold secret sharing, the access structure is defined
by a threshold on the cardinality of authorized subsets: a
(t, n)-SSS refers to a scheme in which any t out of n partic-
ipants can recover the secret. Apart from Shamir’s Lagrange
interpolation-based scheme [1] and Blakley’s scheme utilizing
the idea that any n nonparallel (n − 1)-dimensional hyper-
planes intersect at a specific point [2], Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT)-based threshold schemes by Mignotte [4] and
Asmuth and Bloom [5] also exist. While Mignotte’s (t, n)
scheme is not perfect in the sense that less than t shares reveal
information about the secret, Asmuth-Bloom’s scheme attains
a better security level with a careful choice of parameters. We
refer the reader to [6] for an extensive study on the security
of CRT based SSSs.
Given the universal participant set U , a partition of U
into disjoint subsets, i.e., compartments, is used to define a
multipartite access structure on U . Unlike traditional threshold
secret sharing that has only one threshold, different thresholds
and conditions may be imposed for different compartments.
On the other hand, multipartite schemes do not distinguish
the members of the same compartment.
Although there exist methods for general access structures,
e.g., [7], [8], [9], the schemes designed for specific access
structures are almost always more efficient and hence, more
practical. Such an access structure which has applications
in practice is the multilevel/hierarchical access structure, a
special form of the multipartite case, that employs a hierarchy
between the compartments where the members of a superior
compartment are more powerful and can replace the partici-
pants of an inferior one following the hierarchy definition of
Simmons [10] that is further studied in [11]. Simmons gave
the following example: assume that a bank transfer requires
authorization and any two vice presidents or any three senior
tellers are authorized to approve. In this example, there are
two compartments (vice presidents and senior tellers) where
the members of the former can also replace members of the
latter. That is, a vice president together with two senior tellers
are able to approve the transfer as well. In a recent work of
Harn and Fuyou [12], a multilevel CRT-based SSS is proposed
for an access structure involving a hierarchy of compartments
as in the definition of Simmons.
The above mentioned access structure is disjunctive; if a
coalition satisfies any of the threshold conditions of the com-
partments (that is, the presence of either two vice presidents
or three senior tellers), then it is in the access structure. A
more restricted conjunctive form where all the compartments’
thresholds need to be satisfied by a valid coalition can also be
employed in practice. For example, suppose a bank transfer
now requires the authorization of any two vice presidents and
any three senior tellers for the example above. Note that dif-
ferent from the disjunctive scheme, a coalition needs to satisfy
all the thresholds in the conjunctive form. Hence, with this re-
quirement, a vice president and two senior tellers (or only three
senior tellers) cannot authorize a transfer as they could in the
disjunctive case. Although a CRT-based conjunctive threshold
SSS has been proposed by Iftene et al. [13], to the best of
our knowledge, there is no hierarchical/multilevel conjunctive
secret sharing scheme based on CRT in the literature.
There are multiple contributions of this paper: First, we
show that the Harn-Fuyou scheme cannot be applied (i.e.,
is not well-defined) for all the access structures A in the
multilevel setting, and furthermore it is not secure, i.e., the
secret can be reconstructed by an unauthorized coalition that is
not in A. Second, by using an anchor Asmuth-Bloom sequence,
2we propose a more naive and novel CRT-based SSS for the
multilevel access structures which does not suffer from these
drawbacks. And third, based on similar techniques, we propose
the first multilevel conjunctive threshold SSS based on CRT.
In addition to the main contributions, we also discuss
how the proposed schemes can be employed for multilevel
function sharing; a natural extension of secret sharing. A
plain SSS is inappropriate for public key cryptography, since
when a (shared) secret is reconstructed, it is known by all
the participants and cannot be used again. A function sharing
scheme (FSS) employs a SSS to share the keys/secrets so
that operations such as decryption or signing can only be
performed by a valid coalition (in A) and without revealing
the secret. As usual, a coalition that is not in A cannot perform
such operations and cannot obtain any information on the
secret. Function sharing schemes enable many applications in
practice such as the fair sale of digital content in exchange for
digital receipts, secure bidding, and secret election protocols.
There are numerous studies on function sharing; the work of
Shoup [14] can be considered as one of the milestones of
the field, proposing a provably secure, non-interactive FSS
joining RSA and Shamir’s SSS. The first CRT based function
sharing schemes for RSA, ElGamal and Paillier cryptosystems
are given in [15].
After covering some preliminary definitions and schemes in
Section II, we point out some shortcomings and the insecurity
of the Harn-Fuyou scheme in Section III. We present our
conjunctive and disjunctive multilevel secret sharing schemes
in Section IV, and in Section V, we discuss and show how the
proposed schemes can be adopted for function sharing by us-
ing RSA signature/decryption [16] as an example. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
Given the following system of congruences
x =s1mod p1
x =s2mod p2
.
.
.
x =snmod pn,
the Chinese Remainder Theorem states that there is a unique
solution x ∈ ZP such that
x =
n∑
i=1
P
pi
Iisi mod P,
where P = lcm(p1, p2, . . . , pn) and Ii is the inverse of P/pi
in modulo pi, i.e., Ppi Ii mod pi = 1. Thus when the pi
values are chosen pairwise coprime (or all prime) P becomes
p1p2 . . . pn.
A. Mignotte’s secret sharing
Mignotte’s SSS is a direct application of CRT with one
specification: With n participants and a threshold t ≤ n,
given the sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers (or
primes) p1 < p2 < . . . < pn, the secret s is chosen from
the interval (pn−t+2pn−t+3 . . . pn , p1p2 . . . pt). The share of
each participant ui is si = s mod pi. Since s is greater
than the product of the greatest t − 1 primes, a set of t − 1
participants cannot (uniquely) reconstruct the secret. On the
other hand, t or more participants can reconstruct s since it is
smaller than the product of the smallest t primes. As all the
parameters except the private shares si are public, the secret
reconstruction is a straightforward application of CRT. It is
important to notice that the Mignotte (t, n)-threshold secret-
sharing scheme is not perfect in the sense that a set of less
than t shares reveals some information about the secret.
B. Asmuth-Bloom’s secret sharing
Let p0 be a prime which defines the secret space and s ∈
Zp0 be the secret. Let M be
∏t
i=1 pi, and p0 < p1 < p2 <
. . . < pn be an increasing sequence of primes such that
p0
t−1∏
i=1
pn−i+1 < M. (1)
To share the secret, the dealer first chooses a random positive
integer α such that 0 ≤ y = s+ αp0 < M . The share of the
participant ui is equal to si = y mod pi. Let A ∈ A be a
coalition of t participants and let MA =
∏
i∈A pi. Then the
shared integer y can be uniquely reconstructed in ZMA since
y < M ≤ MA. Hence, the secret s can later be obtained by
computing y mod p0.
Asmuth Bloom’s SSS has better security properties when
compared to Mignotte’s. When a coalition A′ with t−1 shares
tries to reconstruct the secret, due to (1), there will be at least
M
MA′
> p0 candidates for y. Furthermore, since p0 is relatively
prime with MA′ , there will be at least one y candidate valid
for each possible secret candidate in Zp0 . Thus, t−1 or fewer
participants cannot narrow down the secret space. However,
since the number of y candidates for two secret candidates
may differ (by one), the secret candidates are not equally
probable, resulting in an imperfect distribution [15]. To solve
this problem, Kaya et al. proposed to use the equation
p0
2
t−1∏
i=1
pn−i+1 < M (2)
instead of (1), which forms a statistical scheme with respect
to the definition given in [3]. We will follow the same idea in
this work. For the rest of the paper, we will use the notation
given in Table I.
C. Multilevel threshold secret sharing
We employ Simmons’ multilevel threshold secret shar-
ing (MTSS) definition, which assumes a multipartite access
structure and a hierarchy on it such that the members of
the superior compartments (higher-level members) can replace
the ones from inferior compartments (lower-level members).
Throughout the paper, the terms level and compartment are
used interchangeably for our context.
Let U be a set of all participants composed of disjoint
subsets called levels, i.e, U =
⋃m
i=1 Li where Li ∩ Lj = ∅
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Here L1 is the highest level and
3Notation Explanation
U The set of participants.
A The collection of authorized subsets of U , the access structure.
n The number of total participants.
m The number of levels\compartments.
uk The kth participant.
Li The ith level\compartment.
ni The number of participants in Li.
ti The threshold, the minimum number of users
required to construct the secret for level Li.
Ui
∑i
k=1 Lk .
s The secret to be shared.
s
j
k
yj mod pk, the share of user uk ∈ Lj .
∆si
k
yi − hk(s
j
k
, i) mod pk, the public information of user uk for Li.
Mi The modulus of smallest ti ones,
∏ti
j=1 pj .
MA The modulus of coalition A,
∏
ui∈A
pi.
p0 A prime; specifies the domain of s ∈ Zp0 .
pi The prime modulus for user i.
yi si + αi · p0, where αi is the blinding factor.
TABLE I
NOTATION
Lm is the lowest one. Thus, a participant in L1 can take
place of any other participant, and a participant in Lm can
only take place of the participants in Lm. Let the integers
0 < t1 < t2 < . . . < tm be a sequence of threshold values
such that tj ≤ |L1| + |L2| + . . . + |Lj | for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
When considered in the disjunctive setting, the access structure
is defined by using the disjunction of the m conditions on m
compartments as described below.
Definition 1: A (t, n) disjunctive multilevel threshold secret
sharing scheme assigns each participant u ∈ U a secret share
such that the access structure is defined as A = {A ⊂ U :
∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} s.t. |A ∩ (
⋃i
j=1 Lj)| ≥ ti}.
On the other hand, under the conjunctive setting, all the
threshold conditions of the compartments need to be satisfied.
We use the same access structure definition as of [17].
Definition 2: A (t, n) conjunctive multilevel threshold se-
cret sharing scheme assigns each participant u ∈ U a secret
share such that the access structure is defined as A = {A ⊂
U : ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} s.t. |A ∩ (
⋃i
j=1 Lj)| ≥ ti}.
D. The Harn-Fuyou MTSS scheme
Assume that the participants are partitioned into m levels
Li, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Let |Li| = ni be the number of
participants in Li and let ti < ni define a threshold on it. The
threshold of a higher-level is always smaller than the threshold
of a lower-level (i.e., tj < ti for j < i) consistent with the
above MTSS definition. The disjunctive MTSS of Harn and
Fuyou has two phases:
• Share generation: The dealer first selects a prime p0,
defining the secret space as s ∈ Zp0 . For each subset Li
having ni participants, she selects a sequence of pairwise
coprime positive integers (or primes), pi1 < pi2 < . . . <
pini , such that
p0p
i
ni−ti+2p
i
ni−ti+3 . . . p
i
ni < p
i
1p
i
2 . . . p
i
ti ,
and gcd(p0, pik) = 1, k = 1, 2, . . . , ni, where pik is the
public information associated with participant uik, the kth
member of the subset Li. For each such sequence, the
dealer selects an integer αi such that the value s+ αip0
is in the ti−threshold range [12]. That is, αi is chosen
such that
pini−ti+2p
i
ni−ti+3 . . . p
i
ni < s+ αip0 < p
i
1p
i
2 . . . p
i
ti
supposedly in order to prevent the recovery of the value
s+ αip0 with fewer than ti shares.1
For each participant uik, the private share sik that can
directly be used for level Li is generated as sik = s +
αip0 mod p
i
k. In order to enable the use of sik in a
compartment Lj (j > i), the dealer first selects a prime
pik,j such that p
j
tj < p
i
k,j < p
j
nj−tj+2
. She then computes
∆sik,j = (s+ αjp0 − s
i
k) mod p
i
k,j
and broadcasts it with pik,j as a public information.
All selected pik,js during this phase must be relatively
coprime to all other moduli. At the end of the phase, each
participant uik ∈ Li keeps a single private share sik ∈ Zpik
accompanied with the public information (∆sik,j , pik,j)
for j ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . ,m}.
• Secret reconstruction: The secret can be recovered by a
coalition of participants if there are at least tj participants
in the coalition from levels Li where 1 ≤ i ≤ j. By
using the corresponding shares, a system of equations
regarding CRT can be established on the joined shares;
if the participant uik belongs to Lj , i.e., i = j, she can
use her share sik and the modulus pik directly. Otherwise,
i.e., if i < j, her share needs to be modified as sik+∆sik,j
to be used in the lower level Lj and the operations for
this modified share need to be performed in modulo pik,j
while constructing the system of CRT equations. Using
all these shares and a standard CRT construction, a unique
solution y = s + αjp0 can be obtained. Then the secret
can be reconstructed by computing s = y mod p0.
III. THE FALLACIES OF HARN-FUYOU MTSS SCHEME
Although the Harn-Fuyou scheme employs interesting and
useful mini-mechanisms resulting in the first MTSS scheme
employing CRT, there are some unresolved issues as will
be discussed here. A minor problem is that their MTSS is
based on the original Asmuth-Bloom scheme which is not
perfect (i.e., the secret candidates are not statistically equally
likely to be the secret for an invalid coalition with t − 1
shares). Although, this can be neglected if the secret is shared
only once, sharing the same secret multiple times with a non-
perfect scheme in practice may cause significant probabilistic
differences in the secret space. For that reason, we believe that
instead of the original scheme, the modified version proposed
in [15] is more appropriate for a MTSS scheme.
1In the Harn-Fuyou scheme, the lower-bound on yi = s+αip0 constitutes
an extra restriction on the original Asmuth-Bloom scheme and this range
is called t-threshold range therein. That is, while the upper bound Mi =∏ti
j=1 p
i
j remains the same, the lower bound that yi = s+αip0 can attain is
restricted to be greater than pin−t+2 . . . pini rather than 0. Thus, Harn-Fuyou
employs a slightly different version of the Asmuth-Bloom scheme. In our
scheme, we will follow the original bounds.
4The proposed scheme is not generic since there are practical
cases for which it cannot be employed; as mentioned above,
in the share generation phase, there are additional pik,j values
associated with each participant uik for each level Lj lower
than hers. These numbers need to fulfill the condition pjtj <
pik,j < p
j
nj−tj+2
and hence, the scheme implicitly compels the
dealer to initially select the primes pj1 < p
j
2 < . . . < p
j
nj with
a gap allowing sufficient number of primes in between pjtj
and pjnj−tj+2 so that p
i
k,js can fill in. In addition to the gap,
pjtj < p
i
k,j < p
j
nj−tj+2
explicitly states that tj < nj − tj + 2.
Therefore, the Harn-Fuyou scheme is not suitable for the cases
where the compartment threshold composes at least one more
than the majority of the participants as the following simple
setting shows.
Example 1: Let there be two levels L1 and L2 involving
n1 = |L1| = 2 and n2 = |L2| = 3 participants and let the
thresholds be t1 = 2 and t2 = 3. The dealer selects the primes
p0 < p
1
1 < p
1
2 and p0 < p21 < p22 < p23 which need to satisfy
p0p
1
2 < p
1
1p
1
2
p0p
2
2p
2
3 < p
2
1p
2
2p
2
3
to be secure. Recall that pik,j is the prime distributed to
kth user in ith level to be used for participation in a lower
compartment j. Since pik,j must be chosen such that p
j
tj <
pik,j < p
j
nj−tj+2
, we have p23 < p11,2 < p22 and p23 < p22
contradicts with the initial choice of primes p22 < p23.
Hence, placing the primes pik,j between p
j
tj and p
j
nj−tj+2
requires a condition which is not guaranteed to hold in a
generic setting; it simply may be the case that pjtj > p
j
nj−tj+2
,
i.e., tj > ⌈nj2 ⌉ + 1. That is, the existence of some interval
in between the primes is not ensured since there is no order
whatsoever among the primes of different compartments.
The most important problem of the Harn-Fuyou scheme
is in fact its mismatch with the multilevel access structure
of Simmons. In general, the range of the threshold values ti
are given such as 1 ≤ ti ≤
∑i
j=1 |Lj| for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Hence, ti can be greater than ni = |Li| as
∑i
j=1 |Lj| > |Li|.
Nonetheless, in the Harn-Fuyou scheme, the specified primes
pi1 < p
i
2 < . . . , < p
i
ni cease at the index ni, resulting in
the condition p0pini−ti+2p
i
ni−ti+3 . . . p
i
ni < p
i
1p
i
2 . . . p
i
ti being
unclear for large enough ti that exceeds ni. For example, the
scheme is not well-defined for a setting with two compart-
ments L1 and L2, where n1 = 3, n2 = 3, t1 = 2 and
t2 = 4 since there are only 3 users in the second compartment.
The threshold is 4 and a (t, n)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence with
n = 3 and t = 4 does not exist.
A. A straightforward (yet insecure) modification of the Harn-
Fuyou MTSS
One can make the Harn-Fuyou MTSS scheme suitable for
any number of participants and threshold values by removing
the necessity of the additional primes: In the share generation
phase, instead of using a sequence with ni primes pi1 < pi2 <
. . . < pini for compartment Li, the dealer can use a sequence
with Ui primes pi1 < pi2 < . . . < piUi where Ui =
∑i
j=1 nj .
For security, the condition to be satisfied for this prime set is
p0p
i
Ui−ti+2p
i
Ui−ti+3 . . . p
i
Ui < p
i
1p
i
2 . . . p
i
ti
that is well defined for any valid value of ti. Here, the first
ni primes can be used for the participants in Li and the extra
primes piℓ for ℓ > ni can be used for pik,js for the participants
in higher compartments. The random integers αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
are chosen such that 0 ≤ s+αip0 < pi1pi2 . . . piti . The share s
i
k
for participant uik is generated as sik = s + αip0 mod pik,j
as before.
This approach indeed eliminates the need for pik,j to fill in to
a possibly non-existing gap in between pjtj < p
i
k,j < p
j
nj−tj+2
.
As this is the only distinction we describe herein, the rest of
the share generation phase and the secret reconstruction phase
remains essentially intact, and can be performed in a similar
fashion as described before.
Although we established a well-defined scheme for all
possible threshold settings, this approach unfortunately does
not provide security as the following example illustrates.
The example below is given for the modified/fixed version
without the gap existence problem. However, the weakness
also exists in the original MTSS scheme of Harn-Fuyou since
the public information with different prime modulos for a
certain participant reveals extra information as we will show
below.
Example 2: Consider the following setting emerging from the
scheme with the basic fix above. Let p0 = 5 and s = 1 ∈ Z5.
Suppose that we have two compartments L1 and L2 with n1 =
4, n2 = 2, t1 = 2 and t2 = 3. Let
p11 < p
1
2 < p
1
3 < p
1
4 → 11 < 13 < 17 < 23
p21 < p
2
2 < p
2
3 < p
2
4 < p
2
5 < p
2
6 → 29 < 31 < 37 < 61 < 67 < 71
be the primes. The Asmuth-Bloom condition
p0p
i
Ui−ti+2
piUi−ti+3 . . . p
i
Ui
< pi1p
i
2 . . . p
i
ti is satisfied
for both levels since
5× 23 = 115 < 143 = 11× 13,
5× 67× 71 = 23785 < 33263 = 29× 31× 37.
Let α1 = 5 and α2 = 952. Hence,
y1 = s+ α1p0 = 1 + 5× 5 = 26,
y2 = s+ α2p0 = 1 + 952× 5 = 4761,
and these values are chosen from the t-threshold range since
23 < 26 < 143 = 11× 13,
67× 71 = 4757 < 4761 < 33263 = 29× 31× 37.
Similarly, let p11,2 = p26 = 71, p12,2 = p25 = 67, p13,2 = p24 =
61, p14,2 = p
2
3 = 37 be the additional primes that will be
used to enable the share of the participants in L1 for L2. With
these parameters, the shares are
s11 = 4, s
1
2 = 0, s
1
3 = 9, and s14 = 3,
s21 = 5 and s22 = 18
5s11,2 = 25, s
1
2,2 = 3, s
1
3,2 = 4, and s14,2 = 4,
and the public information is computed as
∆s11,2 = 0,∆s
1
2,1 = 4,∆s
1
3,1 = 55,∆s
1
4,1 = 22.
To exemplify, the first participant in L1 is associated with the
prime p11 = 11 as well as the prime p11,2 = 71 and the integer
∆s11,2 = (s+ α2p0)− s
1
1 = 0 (in mod p11,2).
Suppose that the adversary corrupted u21 and u22 hence
obtained their shares. She knows that y2 is bounded by 4757 <
y2 < 33263 and she also can compute y2 mod p21p22 = y2
mod 899 = 266 by using these shares. There are ⌈(33263−
4757)/899⌉= 32 candidates for y2 all in form 266+899×K
where 5 ≤ K ≤ 36. Since, 899 is relatively prime with
5, each secret candidate in Zp0 must be valid for around
7 of these values, i.e., for 266 + 899 × 6 the valid secret
candidate is 0. Hence, without the public information, thanks
to the perfectness of Asmuth-Bloom SSS, the adversary cannot
have an information on the secret. Unfortunately, with public
information that reveal extra information for the uncorrupted
users, the adversary can gain some information on the secret
and sometimes she even can find the secret as shown in the
example below.
The participant u11 has a public information pair
(∆s11,2, p
1
1,2) = (0, 71) and her prime is p11 = 11. Hence,
the adversary knows that the value s11,2 is bounded by s11,2 =
s11+∆s
1
1,2 ∈ [0, 10] since s11 ∈ Z11. Similarly, for u12, u13, and
u14, the adversary knows that
s12,2 ∈ [4, 16], s
1
3,2 ∈ [55, 60] ∪ [0, 10], s
1
2,2 ∈ [22, 36]∪ [0, 7].
As the Table II shows, there is only one y2 candidate in
the form 51 + 899K , which yields s1{1,2,3,4},2 values within
these ranges. Thus the adversary knows that y2 = 4761 and
the secret s = 1 is recovered in an unauthorized manner by
corrupting only two participants from L2.
IV. PROPOSED MULTILEVEL THRESHOLD SECRET
SHARING SCHEMES
As described before, we are given a secret s ∈ Zp0 and a
set of primes such that
p0
2
t−1∏
i=1
pn−i+1 <
t∏
i=1
pi, (3)
i.e., the Asmuth-Bloom condition holds. We will refer to the
prime sequence p0 < p1 < p2 < . . . < pn satisfying the
Asmuth-Bloom condition as a (t, n)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence.
As the fallacies of the Harn-Fuyou scheme show, having the
Asmuth-Bloom condition for all the compartments indepen-
dently while keeping the level structure and being secure is
not an easy task. We solve this problem by using a single
anchor Asmuth-Bloom sequence as defined below so that each
participant of the MTSS has only one prime modulus that can
be used for all the levels she can contribute to.
Definition 3: An anchor Asmuth-Bloom sequence is a se-
quence of primes p0 < p1 < p2 < . . . < pn satisfying
p0
2
⌊n/2⌋−1∏
i=1
pn−i+1 <
⌊n/2⌋∏
i=1
pi. (4)
As one can notice, an anchor sequence is a valid (⌊n/2⌋ , n)-
Asmuth-Bloom sequence. Here, we will show that, an anchor
sequence can be used not only for t = ⌊n/2⌋ but also for
other t values:
Lemma 4: An anchor Asmuth-Bloom sequence can be em-
ployed for any CRT-based (t, n) secret sharing scheme. That
is an anchor prime sequence satisfies the Asmuth-Bloom
condition for any 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
Proof: We will investigate the sequence in two cases:
1) (t < ⌊n/2⌋): To have (3) from (4) for a threshold value
t < ⌊n/2⌋, one can remove ⌊n/2⌋− t primes from each
side of (4). Note that for each prime pi removed from
the right side, one needs to remove pn−i+1 from the
left. Since i ≤ t < ⌊n/2⌋ for all the primes removed,
n− i+ 1 > i and pn−i+1 > pi. Thus, given the anchor
inequality (4), the Asmuth-Bloom condition (3) is also
satisfied for a threshold t < ⌊n/2⌋ with the same set of
primes.
2) (t ≥ ⌊n/2⌋): This case is similar to the former case
except that to have (3) from (4), we need to add t −
⌊n/2⌋ primes to each side of (4). For each prime pair
(pn−i+1, pi) added to the left and right of the anchor
inequality, respectively, pn−i+1 < pi since t ≤ i >
⌊n/2⌋. Thus given (4), (3) is also satisfied for a threshold
value t ≥ ⌊n/2⌋ with the same prime sequence. 
A. A novel CRT-based multilevel threshold (disjunctive) SSS
Let n =
∑m
i=1 ni be the number of total participants. Let
hi : Zpi × Zm → Zpi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a family of
efficiently computable one-way hash functions. We employ
an anchor sequence of n primes as follows:
• Initialization: The dealer first generates an anchor prime
sequence p0 < p1 < p2 < . . . < pn satisfying (4) and
assign each prime pi to a participant ui. Note that this
will be the only prime modulus that will be used for the
participant2.
• Share generation: Given a secret s ∈ Zp0 , the dealer
chooses αi’s for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that
0 ≤ yi = s+ αip0 < Mi = p1p2 . . . pti .
For level Li, the shares and the public information are
generated as follows: Let uk be a participant in Li; the
original share sik for uk is generated as sik = yi mod pk.
If uk is a participant in a higher compartment Lj , i.e.,
j < i; to enable the use of sjk in Li, the dealer computes
∆sik = (yi−hk(s
j
k, i)) mod pk and broadcasts it as the
public information. This information will be used if uk
participates in the secret reconstruction within Li.
• Secret reconstruction: Let A be a coalition gathered to
reconstruct the secret. A is an authorized coalition if it has
ti or more participants from Li or higher compartments
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If the participant is from Li, her share sik
can be used as is. Any other share sjk of uk from a higher
2While describing the proposed schemes, we will denote the primes and
participants with a single subscript as opposed to the notation in Harn-Fuyou
scheme. We believe this is more clear thanks to the compactness of the anchor
sequence we employ.
6candidate s11,2 s12,2 s13,2 s14,2 candidate s11,2 s12,2 s13,2 s14,2
4761 4 4 3 25 19145 46 50 52 16
5660 51 32 48 36 20044 22 11 36 27
6559 27 60 32 10 20943 69 39 20 1
7458 3 21 16 21 21842 45 0 4 12
8357 50 49 0 32 22741 21 28 49 23
9256 26 10 45 6 23640 68 56 33 34
10155 2 38 29 17 24539 44 17 17 8
11054 49 66 13 28 25438 20 45 1 19
11953 25 27 58 2 26337 67 6 46 30
12852 1 55 42 13 27236 43 34 30 4
13751 48 16 26 24 28135 19 62 14 15
14650 24 44 10 35 29034 66 23 59 26
15549 0 5 55 9 29933 42 51 43 0
16448 47 33 39 20 30832 18 12 27 11
17347 23 61 23 31 31731 65 40 11 22
18246 70 22 7 5 32630 41 1 56 33
TABLE II
SECRETS FOR EACH y2 CANDIDATE FROM ADVERSARY’S POINT OF VIEW FOR EXAMPLE 2.
THE VALUES CONSISTENT WITH THE RANGES OBTAINED BY PUBLIC INFORMATION ARE SHOWN IN BOLDFACE.
level needs to be modified as (sjk + ∆sik) and is used
with the modulus pk while constructing the system of
congruences. Using the standard CRT, a unique solution
yi can be obtained. Then, the secret s is recovered by
computing s = yi mod p0.
An authorized coalition can obtain the secret since with
the help of public information, the coalition will have enough
shares for a compartment Li. Thanks to CRT, the correspond-
ing yi value and hence s = yi mod p0 can be computed.
1) Security analysis of the proposed MTSS: The security
of the proposed MTSS solely depends on the security of the
Asmuth-Bloom scheme. We will argue that unlike the Harn-
Fuyou scheme, the proposed MTSS scheme does not reveal
any information on the secret with the public information used.
Then, we will prove that an adversarial coalition cannot have
any information on the secret.
To generate the public information, the proposed MTSS
scheme employs a hash function for each participant. Let uk
be a participant in Lj . If the adversary corrupts uk she will
have sjk and she can compute the shares for all levels Lj ,
j ≤ i ≤ m. If uk remains uncorrupted, the adversary will
only have the public information for uk. Let Li be a level
lower than j; the adversary will have
∆sik = (s
i
k − hk(s
j
k, i)) mod pk (5)
Hence, assuming the hash function hk behaves like a random
oracle, ∆sik will be random (which can be randomly generated
in a zero-knowledge proof). Thus the adversary cannot learn
anything on the shares of uk for lower compartments. Further-
more, although the same hash function hk is used to compute
∆sik and ∆si
′
k for two lower levels Li and Li′ , j ≤ i, i′ ≤ m,
these two values cannot be combined (as they could be without
the hash function), since hk takes i and i′, respectively, as an
input.
Theorem 5: Given that the hash functions used in the MTSS
scheme behave like random oracles, an unauthorized coalition
cannot obtain any information about the secret.
Proof: Let A′ be the adversarial coalition having ti − 1
participants from Li and higher compartments. Let MA′
be the product of the prime modulus values assigned to
these ti − 1 participants and y′i = yi mod MA′ . Since
p0
2
∏ti−1
j=1 pn−j+1 <
∏ti
j=1 pj <
∏ti
j=1 pj = Mi, we have
Mi/MA′ > p0
2
. Hence y′i + βMA′ is a valid candidate for
yi < M for all β < p02. Since gcd(p0,MA′) = 1, all
(y′ + βMA′) mod p0 are distinct for ℓp0 ≤ β < (ℓ + 1)p0,
for each 0 ≤ ℓ < p0. Thus s can be any integer from Zp0 and
the secret space is not restricted from the adversary’s point of
view.
For each value s′ in the secret space, from the adver-
sary’s point of view, there are either ⌊Mi/(MA′p0)⌋ or
⌊Mi/(MA′p0)⌋+1 possible consistent yi candidates consistent
with s′. Considering Mi/MA′ > p02, for two different integers
s′ and s′′ in Zp0 , the probabilities of s = s′ or s = s′′
are almost equal and the difference between these two values
reduces when p0 increases. More formally, thanks to the
modified Asmuth-Bloom SSS we employed [15], the pro-
posed MTSS scheme is statistical, i.e., the statistical distance
between the probability distribution of the secret candidates
being a secret and an uniform distribution is smaller than a
given ǫ with a carefully chosen p0. 
B. A CRT-based multilevel threshold (conjunctive) SSS
The ideas presented above for the disjunctive scheme can
also be employed to have a conjuctive SSS. Here, we present
the first CRT-based conjunctive MTSS scheme which adopts
Iftene’s CRT-based compartmented SSS [13].
The setting is the same as that of the disjunctive MTSS
scheme; compartment Li with threshold ti has ni participants
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence, the total number of participants is
n =
∑m
i=1 ni. There is a hierarchy between the compartments;
a member of Lj can act as a member of a lower compartment
Li if i > j. The proposed conjunctive scheme shares a given
secret s ∈ Zp0 as follows:
• Initialization: The anchor prime sequence generation is
the same. Let σ1, σ2, . . . , σm−1 be random integers from
Zp0 and σm ∈ Zp0 is chosen such that
s = (σ1 + σ2 + · · ·+ σm) mod p0.
• Share generation: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, a random αi is cho-
sen such that 0 ≤ yi = σi + αip0 < Mi = p1p2 . . . pti .
The shares and public information are generated similar
to the disjunctive case. Let uk be a participant in Li; the
original share sik for uk is generated as sik = yi mod pk.
7For all uk who is from a higher level Lj to enable the use
of sjk in Li, ∆sik = (yi−hk(s
j
k, i)) mod pk is computed
and broadcasted.
• Secret reconstruction: The secret s can be recovered if
and only if all of the σi values for 1 ≤ i ≤ m are
recovered. A partial secret σi can be recovered if the
number of shares from level Li or from higher levels is
greater than or equal to ti. Let uk be a coalition member
participating in this task; if uk ∈ Li, her original share
sik can be used. Otherwise, if uk ∈ Lj for j < i, s
j
k +
∆sik is computed and used as sik. After computing all
σi values for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the secret s is constructed by
s = (σ1 + σ2 + · · ·+ σm) mod p0.
Since the scheme uses exactly the same set of public
information and the underlying statistical SSS is the same, the
security analysis for the disjunctive case can also be applied
for the conjunctive MTSS scheme with minor modifications
and is omitted here.
V. MULTILEVEL THRESHOLD FUNCTION SHARING
In this section, we adapt our MTSS scheme to have a CRT-
based multilevel function sharing scheme (FSS) which can be
used for decrypting a ciphertext or signing a message in a
way that no unqualified coalition of participants can perform
this operation. Another important property of a FSS is that it
does not disclose the secret and the shares; thus, it can be used
several times without any rearrangement. Several protocols for
function sharing [18], [19], [20] have been proposed in the lit-
erature where most of them are based on the Shamir SSS. Kaya
and Selc¸uk [15] proposed the first CRT-based FSS for RSA
signature [21] and the ElGamal [22] decryption functions.
Here, we propose a secure CRT-based multilevel function
sharing scheme (MFSS) for RSA signatures to demonstrate
that the proposed MTSS scheme is applicable for function
sharing.
A Threshold (disjunctive) RSA Signature Scheme: Let
N = pq be product of two large primes. Choose public key
e and private key d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). The
signature of a message msg is sgn = msgd (mod N) and
the verification is done by checking msg ?= sgne (mod N).
The setup phase for the threshold multilevel RSA scheme is
given in Figure 1 and the signature and verification steps can
be found in Figure 2. Here we describe a disjunctive scheme
but the scheme can be converted to the conjunctive case with
minor modifications.
Security Analysis: Since the proposed MTSS scheme is
as secure as the original Asmuth Bloom SSS by Theorem 5
and the adapted threshold signature scheme is proven to be
secure with the Asmuth-Bloom structure [15], the proposed
MFSS is also secure under the assumption of intractability of
the RSA problem. Detailed explanations about random oracle
proofs for the CRT-based threshold RSA can be found in [15].
VI. CONCLUSION
The CRT-based multilevel threshold SSS of Harn-Fuyou
in the literature cannot be used for all threshold settings.
Furthermore, the scheme is not secure and an adversary can
extract the secret by using the private shares of the participants
she corrupted and information revealed to the public during
the secret sharing phase. We proposed novel, compact, and
elegant disjunctive and conjunctive multilevel SSSs based on
a special prime sequence called anchor sequence. We showed
that the proposed schemes can easily be adopted for function
sharing schemes which have numerous applications in applied
cryptography.
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8- Let N = pq be product of two strong primes, i.e. p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 where p′ and q′ are
large primes.
- Choose e and d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)), (φ(N) = 4p′q′).
- Use the proposed MTSS scheme in order to share the secret s = d with p0 = 4p′q′ to m levels where
the ith level Li has ni users with a threshold ti.
Fig. 1. Setup of the proposed multilevel (disjunctive) threshold RSA signature scheme.
Signing
- Let msg ∈ Z∗N be the message to be signed.
- Let A ∈ A be a coalition in the access structure wants to sign msg.
- Let i be an integer s.t. Ai = A ∩ (
⋃i
j=1
Lj) and |Ai| ≥ ti.
- Each user uk ∈ Ai computes
MAi =
∏
uk′∈Ai
pk′ and Pk =
MAi
pk
mod pk
and Ik, the inverse of Pk s.t. IkPk ≡ 1 mod pk. She then computes the partial signature sgnk as
sik =
{
sik if uk ∈ Li
s
j
k if uk ∈ Lj and j < i
νk = sikPkIk modMAi ,
sgnk = msg
νk mod N
and sends sgnk to the server.
- For each user uk , Server computes public parts of the signature as
∆sik =
{
0 if uk ∈ Li
∆sik if uk ∈ Lj and j < i
∆νk = ∆sikPkIk modMAi ,
∆sgnk = msg
∆νk mod N
Server combines all parts and computes incomplete signature sgn
sgn =
∏
uk′∈Ai
(sgnk ×∆sgnk)
Server converts incomplete signature sgn to the signature sgn by trying x
(sgn× κx)e
?
≡msg mod N (6)
for 0 ≤ x < 2|G| and let δ denotes the value of x satisfying (6).
Then the signature is computed as sgn = sgn× κδ
Fig. 2. Proposed multilevel (disjunctive) threshold RSA signature scheme: verification phase is not given since it is the same as the RSA verification
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